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Abstract. Reverse engineering of communication protocols is aimed at
providing methods and tools allowing to infer a model of these protocols.
It is very relevant for many application domains, such as interoperability
or security audits. Recently, several tools have been developed in order
to automate, entirely or partially, the protocol inference process. These
tools rely on several techniques, that are usually tuned and adapted
according to the final goal of the reverse engineering task. The aim of
this paper is 1) to present an overview of the main challenges related to
reverse engineering, and 2) to introduce the use of obfuscation techniques
to make the reverse engineering process more complex and difficult in
particular to malicious users.
1 Introduction
Communication protocols allow several components to exchange messages in a
consistent way. They are widely used in networks and telecommunications do-
mains. A protocol may be published in an open standard or it may be proprietary
and thus hidden from a user of the component. Reverse engineering is mainly
useful in this second case, in the context of non documented and non standard-
ised close protocols. Protocol reverse engineering consists in inferring a model of
communications established between several components.
Samba project is a popular example of protocol reverse engineering [16]. It
offers an open-source implementation of SMB/CIFS protocols for Linux clients,
enabling Linux and Windows systems to interoperate. At its beginning in 1992,
this project was mainly based on manual reverse, a tricky and time consuming
work whose success is tightly linked to the skills of the analysts. Moreover,
keeping pace with protocol evolutions was a real challenge.
Protocol reverse engineering techniques are most of the time classified into
two categories: network traces analysis tools, and application execution traces
analysis tools. They can also be differentiated according to their inference type:
passive or active. While active inference stimulates the system in order to dis-
cover or validate information, passive inference is only based on captured data.
During the past decade, several protocol reverse engineering tools have been
developed [14]. The main application domains of reverse engineering are pre-
sented in Section 2. The contribution of this paper is twofold: i) Section 3 dis-
cusses the main open challenges raised in the context of protocol reverse engi-
neering, and ii) Section 4 presents a proposal to make reverse engineering more
difficult to perform for attackers, thanks to the use of obfuscation techniques.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Protocol reverse application domains
As presented in the introduction, interoperability is one of the domains con-
cerned by reverse engineering. Network protocols simulation is another
domain, with tools such as Scriptgen [13], RolePlayer [9], Replayer [15] or
Rosetta [6]. Network simulators are useful to quickly prototype some specific
tests of a protocol whereas performing such tests on a real implementation may
be tedious or practically impossible. Furthermore, a network simulator may re-
play communications, in various environments, and possibly adapt them. It is
relevant e.g., to analyse a network attack or to develop honeypots that can
interact with attackers in order to record and analyse their behaviour.
Software security audits (and associated tools: Netzob [3], Polyglot [7]
or Tupni [10]) is another relevant application domain which is closely linked to
the previous one. However, its main goal differs: a component is solicited under
various scenarios to check whether it correctly handles communications in such
scenarios. Thus, a model of the protocol may be used in order to develop smart
fuzzers useful for testing robustness of a protocol implementation.
Some tools like Netzob [2] again or Dispatcher [5, 8] enable Malware proto-
col analysis. Indeed, many malwares use protocols to communicate with third
parties. The reverse engineering of these protocols is useful to identify some
crucial information regarding the localisation of a botnet master, a date, an im-
minent attack, attack targets, etc, and as a consequence, allows to anticipate an
attack occurrence and to react accordingly.
Finally, reverse engineering can also be used to support network protocol
conformance testing. It consists in checking whether a software correctly im-
plements a network protocol whose specification is known. Reverse engineering
enables to get a model of the protocol as implemented by an application, then
to check whether this model is compliant with its specification or not.
3 Protocol reverse engineering challenges
Protocol reverse engineering raises several challenges. This section presents the
different steps of protocols reverse engineering and their associated challenges.
The preliminary phase of protocols reverse engineering should be dedicated to
the identification and characterisation of the environment. Based on this knowl-
edge, an analyst can start the observation step, which consists in setting up

















Fig. 1. Protocol reverse engineering steps with associated challenges
in sanitizing these traces in order to obtain relevant messages of the protocol
under study. The last step carries out the inference of the message format or
of the protocol grammar, from messages obtained at the previous step. These
different steps are executed according to an iterative process and the expertise
and the intuition of the analyst may largely facilitate some of them. Figure 1
illustrates the steps of the protocol reverse engineering process, and highlights
the main challenges associated to each step.
3.1 Observation step
The inference is based on the gathering of a set of traces thanks to the observation
of a communication channel. Two challenges are associated to this observation
step: probe placement and traces generation.
Probe placement is essential to capture different messages required to pro-
tocol reverse engineering. This may not be obvious if for instance, applications
use several protocols to communicate, each protocol on different channels. Fur-
thermore, a protocol under study may be encapsulated into encrypted channels,
thus, it may be necessary to implement the probe in the application itself, at the
interface of the cryptographic libraries, in order to be able to decrypt the mes-
sages for the sake of the analysis. To our knowledge, this challenge is generally
not addressed by any tool, only Netzob proposes some generic probes [3].
Collected traces quality also depends on observation duration. A too short
observation phase may lead to a poor trace, not containing a set of all the possible
message sequences. Such a trace may lead to an incomplete inference. Thus, it is
important to identify when the trace is sufficiently rich to be exploitable. This
depends on components involved in the protocol as well as their communication
frequency. In some cases, to obtain more quickly some appropriate traces, the
analyst may adopt an active approach, by stimulating the system, e.g. in [3].
3.2 Pre-processing step
The pre-processing step may be all the more difficult to carry out as an analyst
could not place the probes ideally. In this case, collected traces may contain irrel-
evant information that have to be filtered out. Furthermore, messages relevant
to a protocol under reverse engineering may be 1) encapsulated into another
protocol; 2) split into several packets transferred in multiple exchanges or 3)
observed among messages belonging to other protocols. Thus, a first challenge
in this pre-processing step is to correctly sanitize traces in order to reconstruct
appropriate messages. This corresponds to data sanitization.
When messages are transferred in several packets, another challenge consists
in aggregating traces in order to reconstruct messages for the analysis. This
challenge concerns both the inference based on network traces, (such as for
gathering the TCP segments to obtain a message of an applicative protocol), but
also the inference based on application traces, when the analysis of a message is
split in several execution traces. Moreover, a trace may contain data related to
several messages, thus it is necessary to identify and split corresponding data of
each message. These two elements are referred to as data aggregation. Data
sanitization and aggregation are addressed in [13], but generally left aside.
After their reconstruction, messages are grouped into classes of messages.
This clustering phase is required in order to compare the messages that are se-
mantically equivalent. This phase consists in finding a typing function allowing,
from a message represented as a sequence of bytes, to identify its type. This chal-
lenge is addressed by every network based analysis tools except ReverX [1], but
application based analysis tools generally left it aside.
3.3 Inference step
Message format inference is aimed, from messages of a same type, at iden-
tifying their structure whereas protocol grammar inference is aimed at re-
covering, from sequences of typed messages, rules describing their exchanges. It
is also important to identify dependencies between different fields of a message
or between messages themselves.
The goal of reverse engineering process is to obtain a specification for message
format or protocol grammar. This specification is represented by a model. It
is necessary to choose a sufficiently expressive model so that it can faithfully
reflect the original specification. For instance, some complex message formats
or protocol grammars may have a tree or recursive structure. Such a structure
means that a message or value of a field depends on other messages or other fields.
This dependency is difficult to express with finite state automata for instance.
4 Obfuscation techniques
Our current research work focuses on obfuscation techniques aiming at making
protocol reverse engineering more difficult to perform in the context of inter-
operability or network simulation. Such techniques must be easily plugged to
existing solutions. Previous work [12, 4] has focused on designing protocols sim-
ilar to widely used protocols to bypass network traffic classification. Thus, our
objective is to make it difficult, not to say impossible, for an attacker to entirely
reverse the protocol in a reasonable time. The goal is, given a protocol specifi-
cation, to generate multiple instances of obfuscated protocol, for instance, each
one dedicated to a client. This work is orthogonal to cryptographic solutions,
generally speaking, it is less robust but faster in its treatment.
To reach our objective, we focus on some challenges presented in the previ-
ous section: message typing and the inference itself. Our methodology relies on
the following observations: 1) message typing is mostly realized via similarity
and 2) inferred models are equivalent to regular languages, e.g., message for-
mat only depends on its type. Accordingly, the obfuscated protocols should be
more complex than regular protocols. In this case, generalization performed by
tools will lead to lots of wrong messages. Moreover, we also propose to ensure
that message format depends on the communication context, and to force the
dissimilarity between messages originally belonging to the same type.
We plan to adopt algebraic or contextual languages. Most of the time, mes-
sage format and protocol grammar can both be expressed with formal grammar.
Thus, an obfuscation strategy for one of them can be adapted to the second one.
For example, the message format ”M → <K,V>;M |<K,V>”, correspond-
ing to a list of (key, value) (for instance <K1,V1>;<K2,V2>;<K3,V3>) is
a regular language that can easily be transformed into ”M → <KMV>|,”,
(i.e., <K1<K2<K3,V3>V2>V1>) which corresponds to an algebraic lan-
guage (anbn). The inference of this class of languages is more tricky [11]. More-
over, if modifications injected regularly change, according to the previously ex-
changed message, this means that we enrich the communication with a context
which is difficult to reverse. A same message sent by a component at two different
moments will then be obfuscated in two different ways.
We are currently prototyping our solution. It corresponds to a stub added to
legitimate communicating components. Each message is processed or generated
by this stub, which is itself automatically generated by a framework. Actually,
generated code is derived from the original specification, applying some transfor-
mations on the message format in order to directly handle obfuscated messages.
In other words, the stub is able to directly build and parse obfuscated messages.
For developers of the components, using the original stub or the obsfuscated one
is transparent as the interfaces of message handling functions are identical.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented the main challenges associated to protocols reverse engi-
neering and our first contribution regarding the use of obfuscation techniques
to make reverse a quite complex task. We are currently implementing a proto-
type of an obfuscation framework, based on a contextual grammar that we have
designed for this purpose.
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